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Contrary to what Tablighi Jama'at ac-
tivists insist, the movement does have a
political vision, and is, through the vari-
ous political roles that it plays, deeply
engaged in questions of power and au-
thority. While the movement’s immedi-
ate focus has been on the reform of the
individual, this does not mean that the
TJ has nothing at all to do with politics. If
we shift our attention from the affairs of
the state and see politics in comprehen-
sive terms, as the dynamics of power in
society, the notion that anything can be
apolitical in a political world strikes one
as absurd. In this sense, the TJ can hard-
ly be said to be apolitical. 
Ilyas’s approach to politics
Maulana Ilyas was born in 1885 at Kandhla in northern India. In 1908,
he enrolled at the Dar-ul 'Ulum madrasa in Deoband, where he took an
oath of jihad against the British. Ilyas believed that the Muslims’ loss of
political power owed entirely to their having abandoned the path of
Islam. Muslims were promised that if they faithfully followed the exam-
ple of the Prophet they would ‘dominate over non-believers’ and
would be ‘destined to be the masters of everything on this earth’. ‘Po-
litical power’, Ilyas declared, ‘can never be’ the
objective of a Muslim. However, ‘walking in the
path of the Prophet’, he said, ‘if we attain political
power then we should not shirk the responsibili-
ty’. Hence, political power was not to be shunned,
but neither was it to be directly pursued. Rather,
it would be granted as a blessing by God to the
Muslims once they became ‘true’ believers, after
which the Islamic state would be established.
In this regard, Ilyas did not differ from Islamist
activists as to the final goal. Where he departed
from them was on the appropriate means of at-
taining an Islamic state in the specific Indian con-
text. In contrast to the Islamists, who called for
the capture of political power to establish Islamic
rule, Ilyas advocated working in a gradual man-
ner, encouraging the reform of individual Mus-
lims in the belief that ultimately an Islamic soci-
ety, crowned with an Islamic state, would be es-
t a b l i s h e d .
That the ultimate acquisition of political power in the future was of
central importance to Ilyas’s own vision of Islam is evident in the re-
ports of his association with the Islamic leaders of his time. While
Ilyas saw his movement as geared particularly towards ordinary Mus-
lims, he was not opposed to other contemporary movements strug-
gling for Muslim political power. He believed that the TJ and such
Muslim movements were complimentary to each other. ‘There
should be no competition or rivalry between them’, Ilyas insisted.
This suggests that Ilyas’s understanding of individual reform and his
distance from matters related to the state can be read as reflecting an
underlying division of labour—the TJ focusing on the individual, and
other Muslim groups working in the political sphere. This point is ac-
knowledged by an Indian Muslim ' a l i m, who claims that the TJ’s
aloofness from overt political involvement is simply a temporary
‘pious pragmatic policy’ to enable it to promote ‘Islamic conscious-
ness’ even in situations where governments may place Islamist
groups under strict control.2
TJ and politics after Ilyas
A distinct shift seems to have been wit-
nessed in the TJ after Ilyas’s death in
1944, a trend that became particularly
noticeable in the aftermath of the Par-
tition of India in 1947. In post-1947
India, with Muslims now a beleaguered
minority, the aggressive communal
politics of groups such as the Muslim
League were no longer a feasible op-
tion. Thus, the TJ began presenting it-
self as completely apolitical—in itself
probably a well thought out political
strategy to accommodate itself to the
new context. The TJ, under Ilyas’s son,
Muhammad Yusuf, believed that this
was the only way in which the move-
ment could carry on with its activities
without provoking the state and aggressive Hindu forces. Yet, the TJ’s
activities continued to have serious political implications. Indeed,
there was no way in which they could not, for the TJ’s concern with
Muslim identity and faith have had a crucial bearing on how Muslims
relate to the wider society. 
The adjustment to the reality of the absence of an Islamic political
order enabled Muslims active in the TJ to come to terms with the exis-
tence of non-Islamic regimes. For Indian Muslims this meant that they
could adjust to a system of non-Islamic rule, and to what was, at least
in theory, a secular political system, while hoping that by abiding by
the dictates of their faith, the day might dawn when God would grant
Muslims political power. 
The movement’s growing aloofness from direct involvement in polit-
ical affairs in post-1947 India has helped the TJ flourish in an environ-
ment characterized by considerable anti-Muslim hostility. Thus, for in-
stance, in the period 1975–1977, when the Indian government de-
clared a state of emergency and banned several religious organiza-
tions, the TJ was spared and was allowed to carry on its activities un-
hindered. It is a mark of the politically quiescent theology of the TJ,
which is quite acceptable to the Indian state, that the TJ continues to
have its global headquarters in the very heart of Delhi. As the move-
ment has expanded to other countries where Muslims live as minori-
ties, the TJ’s disavowal of any political aims has enabled it to function
relatively free of state control. In this way, the TJ enabled its followers
to come to terms with the secular state by personalizing Islam, making
a de facto distinction between religion and politics. 
The TJ sees present-day Muslims living in a situation similar to that of
what it calls the Prophet’s ‘Meccan period’, when the Prophet’s follow-
ers in Mecca were still learning about their faith. This is contrasted with
the later ‘Medinan period’ when the Prophet established an Islamic
state. In this way, while not denying the centrality of the Islamic state,
the TJ effectively postpones its establishment into the indefinite future,
when Muslims would become ‘so firm in their faith as to bring back to
life the days of the Companions of the Prophet in Medina’. For the pre-
sent, however, it allows for Muslims to adjust themselves to a situation
of non-Islamic rule while remaining committed to their faith. This ac-
commodation to secularism is, however, ambiguous and not free from
tension. On the one hand, the TJ’s advocacy of global Muslim unity rep-
resents an implicit critique of the nation-state system. Likewise, its ef-
forts at building a sense of Muslim identity, bringing Muslims all over
the world together in a common mission, maintaining a strong sense of
separate cultural identity and superiority, and condemning the popular
culture that Muslims in local contexts share with others, has important
political consequences in religiously plural societies. On the other hand,
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the politically quiescent nature of the
TJ has won for it sharp criticism in some
Muslim circles, who see this posture as
calculated to serve the political inter-
ests of what are described as the ‘ene-
mies of Islam’. Some Muslims see the TJ
as a tool in the hands of ‘anti-Islamic’
forces by helping to de-politicize Mus-
lims by preaching otherworldliness and
disdain for power. 
In some cases the TJ has acted to
counter the influence of Islamist groups
and enable Muslims to come to adjust to
non-Islamic state structures, while in
others it has lent support to Islamist
groups, indirectly, by promoting an en-
vironment in which Islamist groups can
flourish, as well as more directly. In such
cases, participation in the TJ can be seen
as a critique of existing political systems.
It also represents an implicit questioning
of the legitimacy of corrupt ruling élites
with their ‘un-Islamic’ ways. 
TJ and politics in Muslim
majority countries 
The diverse political roles that the TJ has played can be seen in the
dynamics of its relations with the state and with Islamist forces in sev-
eral Muslim countries. In Pakistan, where it has strong presence, the TJ
has been encouraged by the authorities as a counter to the Islamist Ja-
ma'at-i-Islami, which, with its campaign for an Islamic political order,
poses an increasingly powerful political challenge to ruling élites. On
the other hand, the TJ has helped promote commitment to an activist
vision of Islam conducive to the growth of Islamist movements. Thus,
for instance, in Bangladesh, following the suppression of pro-Pakistan
Islamist groups in the wake of the country’s liberation struggle, the TJ
helped keep ‘Islamic sentiment alive’ and ‘created conditions for the
underground Islamic leaders to appear on the surface’. Numerous Is-
lamist activists were able to escape state repression by joining the TJ.
Recognizing the supportive role that the TJ might play vis-à-vis Islamist
movements, one sympathizer writes that the TJ is silently preparing
Muslims all over the world for a goal that he sees it as sharing with Is-
lamist groups—to engage in the ‘lesser jihad’ or physical warfare
against the ‘enemies of Islam’, if required, by training its activists to
sacrifice their money and time for missionary work. However, he says,
‘if occasion arises and if the policy is changed ... Tabligh is the Islamic
movement which can call upon its dedicated followers not only to do-
nate their time and money but also their lives to the cause of Islam’.3
Similarly, another TJ supporter writes that the TJ has been ‘merely lay-
ing the groundwork for a much greater mission’, which includes physi-
cal jihad, if necessary, and the struggle for the establishment of an Is-
lamic polity. In both t a b l i g h and jihad, he says, one can ‘perceive a con-
gruence of aims and objectives’, both being ‘manifestations of the
same impulse’.4
Several individuals originally associated with the TJ have been in-
spired by the movement to assume more assertive political positions in
other Islamist organizations. Some leading Islamist activists have had
their first exposure to Islamic revival in the TJ. These include Ghulam
'Azam, a m i r of Bangladesh’s Jama'at-i Islami, Rachid Ghannoushi of the
Tunisian Islamic Tendency Movement, and Farid Kassim of the Hizb ut-
Tahrir in Britain. Islamists, thus, enjoy an ambiguous relationship with
the TJ. While some condemn it for allegedly being apolitical and thus
helping the ‘enemies of Islam’, others welcome its role in promoting Is-
lamic awareness among Muslims and so helping the cause of Islamist
movements. Thus, for instance, some Muslims associated with the Tal-
iban in Afghanistan, which, like the TJ, has its roots in the Deobandi re-
formist tradition, see the TJ as playing a complimentary role. A pro-Tal-
iban website (http://www.almadinah.org) also supports the TJ. Such
coordination between militants and Tablighi preachers is not limited
to cyberspace. Reports speak of involvement in the work of the TJ of
the militant Pakistan-based Islamist Harkat ul-Mujahidin. A spokesman
of the latter claims that ‘[o]ur people are mostly impressed by the TJ.
Most of our workers come from the TJ.’5
In some Muslim countries, the TJ counts among its activists several
government officials, who play an important role in furthering the aims
of the movement and promoting a gradual Islamization of state struc-
tures and civil society. In this way, too, the TJ has served important po-
litical functions. Thus, in Bangladesh the TJ is active among the coun-
try’s armed forces. In Pakistan, Rafiq Tarar, a TJ activist, served as presi-
dent for a considerable period until he was deposed in June 2001.
Mufti Mahmud, k h a l i f a of the leading Tablighi ideologue, Muhammad
Zakariya, was elected chief minister of Pakistan’s Frontier Province,
playing a leading role in the agitation for the ‘prophetic system’, which
led to the toppling of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Another senior TJ activist,
Javed Nasir, served as the head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence,
being responsible for the formulation of Pakistan’s policy in the
Afghan war. The former prime minister of the country, Nawaz Sharif,
once arranged for Tariq Jamil, senior Tablighi leader, to address his
cabinet on ‘the responsibilities of rulers in the light of Islamic teach-
ings’. In his lecture, Jamil appealed to Sharif to ‘enforce an Islamic sys-
tem’ similar to that in Afghanistan under the Taliban. In this way, TJ ac-
tivists have not desisted from occupying important political posts and
using access to power to further the cause of their movement. 
As this survey suggests, the ways in which TJ activists have been im-
plicated in politics demands a reconsideration of Tablighi apolitical-
n e s s. A more nuanced understanding, that goes beyond the level of
verbal TJ discourse to reveal the political roles that it has played, shows
that the TJ might well be impelled by a long-term political agenda. 
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